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ABSTRACT: A polluted river network is populated with agents (e.g.,
firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) located upstream and down-
stream. This river network must be cleaned, the costs of which must be
shared among the agents. We model this problem as a cost sharing prob-
lem on a tree network. Based on the two theories in international disputes,
namely the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) and the Unlimitted Ter-
ritorial Integrity (UTI), we propose three different cost sharing methods for
the problem. They are the Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS), the Upstream
Equal Sharing (UES), and the Downstream Equal Sharing (DES), respec-
tively. The LRS and the UES generalize Ni and Wang (“Sharing a polluted
river”, Games Econ. Behav., 60 (2007), 176-186) but the DES is new. The
DES is based on a new interpretation of the UTI. We provide axiomatic char-
acterizations for the three methods. We also show that they coincide with
the Shapley values of the three different games that can be defined for the
problem. Moreover, we show that they are in the cores of the three games,
respectively. Our methods can shed light on pollution abatement of a river
network with multiple sovereignties.
JEL classification: C71, D61, D62.
Keywords: River network, Water pollution, Cost sharing, the Shapley value
2
1 Introduction
Since ancient times, control of water resources has been the cause of many
wars and conflicts. Accounting for more than 50% of the land area of the
Earth, more than 200 river basins are shared by two or more sovereign na-
tions. Unfortunately, the majority of this invaluable resource is polluted.
One example is the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin, an international river basin
shared by India, Bangladesh and Nepal. The Great Lakes is another exam-
ple, consisting of a group of five1 large lakes in North America and shared
by Canada and the United States. In many of these shared waters, pollu-
tion has become an increasing threat. To deal with this issue, international
cooperation is needed.
Thus far, the studies on international waters have been focusing on water
sharing. To name a few, they include Barrett (1994), Kilgour and Dinar
(1996, 2001), Ambec and Sprumont (2002), Ambec (2008), Ambec and Ehlers
(2008a,b), Ansink and Ruijs (2008), Marchiori (2010), and Wang (2011).
Recently, there have been a number of papers considering the water pollution
problem. Examples include Weber (2001), Hung and Shaw (2005), Ni and
Wang (2007).
This paper considers the cost sharing problem of a polluted river network.2
Suppose that a number of agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or coun-
tries) are connected in a river network. Some agents are located upstream
and some downstream. In using the river network, agents may generate pol-
lutants such as industrial chemicals, pesticides from agricultural run-off, or
sewage. Consequently, a cost is incurred to each link of the network. These
costs can be the costs that the agents must spend in order to clean up the
polluted water to meet certain environmental standards. Or they can be the
costs needed to maintain the water quality of the river network. Whatever
these costs might be, they must be shared among the agents.
While it is clear that all the agents in the polluted river network should
share the costs of cleaning up the network since these costs are incurred by
their joint uses (or abuses) of the river network, it is not immediately clear
how to assign these costs to each individual agent. While, the rights to use the
1Many people argue that there are six by adding Lake St. Clair.
2This work is motivated by a real life example in Northern China, where a lake was
polluted by the upstream users of the river system. See Subsection 3.4 for the detail.
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river come with responsibilities and responsibilities should be in proportion3
to their rights (uses) of the network, it is often hard if not impossible to
identify precisely how much each agent uses the network and thus contributes
to the pollution. Even these agents’ pollutant emissions can be identified,
the complex interactions (e.g. chemical reactions) of the pollutants in flowing
water make it difficult to estimate their actual impacts on pollution costs.
In the simplest two-agent case (i.e., one upstream and one downstream),
when property rights on water are clearly assigned and the upstream agent’s
pollutant emission is clearly identified, the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960)
implies that the two agents can always resolve their problem through bilat-
eral bargaining. In practice, however, most problems involve more than two
agents. Moreover, property rights on most international river systems are
not well-defined. For instance, in an international river system, downstream
countries may argue that even the upstream countries can do whatever they
want to the water they control but they shouldn’t alter the nature of the
river system to the disadvantage of the downstream countries.4 However,
it is not clear or a simple matter to determine to what extent these rights
actually mean for the water pollution problem. Therefore, it would be much
more difficult to reach an agreement through multilateral bargaining.
To deal with this challenge, we focus on the problem of what a fair al-
location of the pollution costs should be.5 We base our theory on the two
well-known theories in international disputes. They are the theory of Ab-
solute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) and the theory of Unlimited Territorial
Integrity (UTI).6 In fact, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) have applied these
two theories in a water sharing problem. Later, Ni and Wang (2007) use
them in a water pollution sharing problem. Our model differs from Ni and
Wang (2007) in two respects. First, we consider a more general tree network
3Aristotle said that equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally in pro-
portion to their inequality.
4See the Unlimited Territorial Integrity theory below.
5We ignore the strategic reactions of the agents under a given allocation of the pollution
costs, which will affect their polluting behavior and then the actual costs. We do not deal
with the efficiency issue of a cost sharing method in our current model.
6The ATS theory says that a country has absolute sovereignty over the area of any river
basin within its territory. The UTI theory, on the other hand, says that a country shouldn’t
alter the natural conditions within its own territory to the disadvantage of a neighboring
country. For more discussions on the ATS and the UTI, see Godana (1985), Kilgour and
Dinar (1996).
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than their line-tree model. Second, we propose two different but equally
compelling interpretations of the UTI theory. We show that these two differ-
ent interpretations lead to two entirely different cost sharing methods. More
importantly, the new interpretation of the UTI opens door to explore new
cost sharing methods.7
Unlike in the water sharing problem, these two theories, each stand alone
or together, still allow a lot of flexibility in choosing cost sharing methods
in our polluted river network problem. In Ni and Wang (2007), the UTI is
interpreted as a downstream responsibility (DR) principle which says that
an agent is responsible for the cost of cleaning her own link and partially
responsible for the costs of all her downstream links. In our model, we
propose another interpretation of the UTI, which is exactly the opposite of
the above DR principle. That is, the UTI can also imply that an agent is
responsible for the cost of her own link and also partially responsible for
the costs of all her upstream links. We call it the Upstream Responsibility
principle (UR).8
To justify this alternative interpretation, revisit the water sharing prob-
lem of Ambec and Sprumont (2002). It is shown that the combination of
the ATS and the UTI determines a unique water sharing method called the
Downstream Incremental Distribution method (DID). Ambec and Sprumont
show that the DID method lexicographically maximizes the welfare of the
agents according to the ordering from downstream to upstream. Thus, in
a DID distribution the last downstream agent obtains the highest welfare
she can possibly achieve, and then follows by the next to the last, and so
on. If responsibilities should be in proportion to rights in any problem of
distributive justice, then the UTI theory also implies that the downstream
agents should bear some of the upstream costs of the network. To say it
more directly, since they have benefited from being downstream agents in
the water sharing problem, it is compelling to require them to pay part of
the upstream environmental costs.9 In hindsight, downstream agents have
7See the Concluding Remarks Section on the potential directions of research.
8In fact, between these two opposing interpretations, a range of them can be proposed.
For more on this, see Wang (2011) and the Concluding Remarks Section.
9We can further reinforce this argument by pointing out that, in many river networks,
downstream agents may have used the water resources relatively more intensively than
their upstream counterparts. For instance, downstream agents are big industries or cities.
But we hesitate to push this argument too much for the reason that other characteristics
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certain derived upstream responsibilities.
Accordingly, we propose three different cost sharing methods for the prob-
lem. The Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS) method, which corresponds to
the Local Responsibility principle implied by the ATS, assigns costs to agents
based on the costs that are associated with their locations. The Upstream
Equal Sharing (UES) method,10 which corresponds to the Downstream Re-
sponsibility (DR) principle implied by the UTI, assigns costs to agents based
on their associated local costs plus the equal sharing of their downstream
costs. The Downstream Equal Sharing (DES) method is first introduced in
this paper. It corresponds to the Upstream Responsibility principle implied
by the UTI. The DES method assigns to each agent the associated local cost
plus the equal sharing of her upstream costs.
The above three methods are axiomatized, respectively. In Theorem 1,
the Local Responsibility Sharing method is characterized by the axioms of
Additivity, No Blind Costs, and Efficiency. In Theorem 2, the Upstream
Equal Sharing method is characterized by the axioms of Additivity, Inde-
pendence of Upstream Costs, Upstream Symmetry, Independence of Irrele-
vant Costs, and Efficiency. In Theorem 3, the Downstream Equal Sharing
method is characterized by the axioms of Additivity, Independence of Down-
stream Costs, Downstream Symmetry, Independence of Irrelevant Costs, and
Efficiency.
In the characterizations of the three methods, two axioms stand out.
Additivity is an axiom used in all three characterizations. The Independence
of Irrelevant Costs axiom is a new axiom we introduce in this paper and used
in two of the three characterizations (the UES and the DES). As is well-
known in the cost sharing literature, Additivity is a classical axiom (Shapley,
1953; Moulin, 2002). It is a structural axiom that allows us to focus on the
cost sharing methods that depend additively on costs. The Independence of
Irrelevant Costs axiom, on the other hand, is an equity axiom. It says that
an agent should not be responsible for any cost that is irrelevant to her.11
Roughly speaking, we say two agents are irrelevant to each other if they are
on two different branches in a tree. The Independence of Irrelevant Costs
axiom is indispensable in our model.12
of the agents like city size, population, etc. are not considered in our present model.
10Note that the UES is the extension of the UES in Ni and Wang (2007).
11We speak interchangeably between an agent and her associated link cost.
12Note that in Ni and Wang (2007)’s line-tree model, all agents are relevant to each
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We also relate the three methods to the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
We show that each method is the Shapley value of a special game associated
with the problem. The three games are the stand-alone game, the upstream-
oriented game, and the downstream-oriented game, respectively. In the stand-
alone game, the cost of a coalition is given by the total costs of all the agents
in the coalition according to the LR principle. In the upstream-oriented
game, the cost of a coalition is given by the total costs of all the agents in
the coalition plus all their downstream costs according to the DR principle.
In the downstream-oriented game, the cost of a coalition is given by the total
costs of all the agents in the coalition plus all their upstream costs according
to the UR principle. We show that the LRS, the UES, and the DES are the
Shapley values of the above three games, respectively. Moreover, we show
that these three games are all concave and, therefore, the cost allocations
given by these three methods are in the cores of the corresponding games.
Finally, we point out that our work is closely related to the growing
literature on cost sharing problems in networks. In many network problems,
a common feature is that an agent usually uses only a part of the network
and different agents use different parts.13 This is exactly the case in our
polluted river network problem, in which each agent is only related to a
sub-network of the whole network. Apparently, the associated cost sharing
problems are different from the traditional cost sharing models in which a
single cost function (or equivalently, a production function) is shared by all
users. More specifically, in the traditional models, a user contributes to the
total costs by using the production technology jointly owned by all users
to obtain her demand of a good or service. In contrast, in network cost
problems, a user’s contribution to the total costs depends on her location in
the network. Thus, each user is related to only a subset of other users.14 For
new developments and research directions on cost sharing in networks, see
Moulin (2011).
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2, we define the model for
the cost sharing problem on a tree structure and propose the three methods
mentioned above. In Section 3, we introduce a number of axioms and provide
the characterizations for the three methods (Theorems 1-3). Meanwhile, we
other.
13For example, in a gas pipeline network, a customer usually uses a subset of the pipelines
to connect to the source.
14A prominent example is the airport landing fee problem (Littlechild and Owen, 1973).
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study their relationships with the Shapley value and the core. In Subsection
3.4, we provide a real life example that motivated this study. In Section 4,
we conclude our paper with some remarks on potential extensions.
2 The Model
Consider a river network connecting a set of agents, N = {1, 2, ..., n}, directly
or indirectly, to a special agent L, called the lake. The river network is
polluted due to the agents’ use or abuse of the river network. To clean up or
to maintain the river network clean. Certain costs are incurred. We assume
that these costs are associated with all the links and are exogenously given.
The main question is how these costs should be shared among the agents.
Formally, let N ∪ {L} be the set of all agents, and let E be the set of
links on N ∪ {L}. Assume that G = {N ∪ {L}, E} is a tree network; i.e.,
G is a connected graph with no cycle of links. For each agent i ∈ N ∪ {L},
there is a unique path to L, i.e., a sequence of links, (i, j), (j, k), ..., (l,m)
in E, where m = L and (i, j) is the first link in the path. We call the link
(i, j) agent i’s link and the agent j agent i’s immediate downstream agent.
A cost function on the network G is a mapping C : E ∪ {L} → R+, where
C((i, j)) = ci is the cost of agent i’s link (i, j) ∈ E, and C(L) is the cost
associated with L. Sometimes, we also call ci agent i’s cost. With a slight
abuse of notation, denote C(E) =
∑
i∈N ci (the total link costs). A cost-
sharing problem on a river network is a triple (N ∪ {L}, G, C). A solution
to a problem (N ∪ {L}, G,C) is a vector x = (x1, ..., xn, xL) ∈ R
n+1
+ such
that
∑
i xi = C(E) + C(L), where xi is the cost share assigned to agent
i(∈ N ∪ {L}). A method is a mapping x that assigns to each problem
(N ∪{L}, G, C) a solution x(N ∪{L}, G, C). For convenience, we often write
C instead of (N ∪ {L}, G, C), x(C) instead of x(N ∪ {L}, G,C)
For a given tree network G, the upstream-downstream relation among the
agents is uniquely determined by the node L. This upstream-downstream
relation will play an important role in our model. To represent this relation,
we define an upstream-downstream structure for the network.15 Given G,
15This is reminiscent of the permission structure concept used in van den Brink and
Gilles (1996).
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consider first the following mapping P : N ∪ {L} → 2N∪{L}:
P (i) = {j|there is a path from j to L
such that i is j ′s immediate downstream agent in G}.
Note that the set P (i) consists of all the immediate upstream agents of
agent i.
EXAMPLE 1.
1



c1
2



c2
5
3



c3
4



c4

c5
L
cL
Figure 1
In this example, we have the following P .
P (1) = ∅, P (2) = {1}, P (3) = ∅, P (4) = {3}, P (5) = {2, 4}, P (L) = {5}.
The upstream-downstream structure, denoted as Pˆ , is the transitive clo-
sure of P . It is defined as a mapping from N ∪ {L} to 2N∪{L} such that for
all i ∈ N ∪ {L} we have j ∈ Pˆ (i) if and only if there exists h1, ..., hm in
N ∪ {L} such that h1 = i, hk+1 ∈ P (hk) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1, and hm = j.
The agents in Pˆ (i) are called the upstream agents of i in G.
Given Pˆ , its inverse mapping Pˆ−1 is defined by Pˆ−1(i) ≡ {j ∈ N∪{L}|i ∈
Pˆ (j)}. We call the agents in Pˆ−1(i) the downstream agents of i in G. For
every S ⊆ N, denote Pˆ (S) = ∪i∈SPˆ (i).
Note that for a given network G, it has a unique Pˆ .
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EXAMPLE 1 continued: It is easy to check that
Pˆ (1) = ∅, Pˆ (2) = {1}, Pˆ (3) = ∅, Pˆ (4) = {3},
Pˆ (5) = {1, 2, 3, 4}, Pˆ (L) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Pˆ−1(1) = {2, 5, L}, Pˆ−1(2) = {5, L}, Pˆ−1(3) = {4, 5, L},
Pˆ−1(4) = {5, L}, Pˆ−1(5) = {L}, Pˆ−1(L) = ∅.
Given a network G or Pˆ , for any coalition of agents, S ⊆ N ∪ {L}, we
can define three different coalitions of agents that are related to S. The
stand-alone counterpart of S is S itself. The Upstream-oriented counterpart
of S is the coalition
σ(S) ≡ S ∪ Pˆ−1(S), (1)
while the Downstream-oriented counterpart of S is the coalition
α(S) ≡ S ∪ Pˆ (S). (2)
According to the upstream-downstream structure Pˆ , we can define the
following three different cost sharing methods for the problem. First, we be-
gin with a method which can be considered as being based on the Absolute
Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) theory. It is the following so-called Local Re-
sponsibility Sharing Method (LRS).
Definition 1 For any C ∈ Rn+1+ , The Local Responsibility Sharing method
is given by
xLRSi (C) = ci, i = 1, ..., n, L. (3)
Apparently, the LRS method does not depend on Pˆ . But, the following
two methods depend on Pˆ .
Definition 2 The Upstream Equal Sharing method (UES) is defined by
xUESi (C) =
∑
j∈σ({i})
cj
|α({j})|
, i = 1, ..., n, L, (4)
where |α({j})| is the number of agents in α({j}).
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In the UES, an agent’s cost share is the sum of her cost plus the equal
sharing of all her downstream costs. This is the so-called Downstream Re-
sponsibility, derived from the Unlimited Territorial Integrity theory. Roughly
speaking, downstream agents have the rights on the quality of the water they
receive. If upstream agents pollute, thus alter the nature of the water flow,
upstream agents should be held responsible. In other words, upstream agents
have downstream responsibility in sharing their costs. Note that each indi-
vidual agent’s responsibility is dependent on Pˆ .
In contrast, if we require that all the downstream agents are equally
responsible for their upstream costs (the Upstream Responsibility principle),
we then have the following Downstream Equal Sharing method (DES).
Definition 3 The Downstream Equal Sharing method is defined by
xDESi (C) =
∑
j∈α({i})
cj
|σ({j})|
, i = 1, ..., n, L. (5)
In the DES, an agent’s cost share is the sum of her cost plus the equal
sharing of all her upstream costs. This so-called Upstream Responsibility
is also derived from the Unlimited Territorial Integrity theory. To see how,
think of the dual problem of the polluted river problem, the water sharing
problem. In water sharing, downstream agents have the rights on the quantity
of water they can possibly receive from the upstream under the condition that
all the upstream agents have received their maximum welfare levels they can
possibly achieve given the water resources they control.16 As we mentioned
in the introduction, in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) this argument gives rise
to a water sharing method17 called the Downstream Incremental Distribution
method, which favors the downstream agents. We argue that when it comes
to cost sharing (responsibility), the downstream agents should inherit certain
proportion of responsibility in sharing the upstream costs. Like the UES, each
individual agent’s specific responsibility also depends on Pˆ . But unlike the
UES, the DES is based on the Upstream Responsibility principle.
16This does not mean that upstream agents would use up all the water they control. In
fact, they might do better by transferring some water to their downstream counterparts
and receiving certain monetary transfers from them. See Ambec and Sprumont (2002).
17To be precise, it is a welfare distribution method which corresponds to a water
allocation.
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Interestingly, the above three methods coincide with the Shapley values
of three different games that can be defined for the problem. These games
embody different interpretations of the ATS and the UTI theories.
Specifically, for any given problem (N∪{L}, G, C) we define the following
three games: the stand-alone game, the Upstream-oriented game and the
Downstream-oriented game, respectively.
Definition 4 Let (N∪{L}, G, C) be a problem. Define the stand-alone game
Ls.a.(C) as follows:
Ls.a.(C)(∅) = 0, Ls.a.(C)(S) = C(S), S ⊆ N ∪ {L}, (6)
where C(S) =
∑
i∈S ci is the total cost of the links associated with S.
Definition 5 Let (N∪{L}, G,C) be a problem. Define the Upstream-oriented
game LU(C) as follows:
LU(C)(∅) = 0, LU(C)(S) = C(σ(S)), S ⊆ N ∪ {L}. (7)
where σ(S) is defined in (1)
Definition 6 Let (N ∪ {L}, G, C) be a problem. Define the Downstream-
oriented game LD(C) as follows:
LD(C)(∅) = 0, LD(C)(S) = C(α(S)), S ⊆ N ∪ {L}. (8)
where α(S) is defined in (2)
EXAMPLE 2. The Upstream-oriented game and the Downstream-oriented
game generated from the problem in EXAMPLE 1 are given below. Note
that not all coalitional values are listed.
The Upstream-oriented Game LU(C):
LU(C)(1) = c1 + c2 + c5 + cL, L
U(C)(3) = c3 + c4 + c5 + cL,
LU(C)(1, 2) = c1 + c2 + c5 + cL, L
U(C)(1, 3) = c1 + c2 + c3 + c4 + c5 + cL,
LU(C)(2, 3) = c2 + c3 + c4 + c5 + cL, L
U(C)(2, 5) = c2 + c5 + cL,
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LU(C)(1, 2, 3) = c1+ c2+ c3+ c4+ c5+ cL, L
U(C)(1, 2, 5) = c1+ c2+ c5+ cL,
LU(C)(1, 2, 3, 4) = c1+c2+c3+c4+c5+cL, L
U(C)(1, 3, 4, 5) = c1+c2+c3+c4+c5+cL,
LU(C)(1, 2, 3, 4, 5) = c1+c2+c3+c4+c5+cL, L
U(C)(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, L) = c1+c2+c3+c4+c5+cL.
The Downstream-oriented Game LD(C):
LD(C)(1) = c1, L
D(C)(3) = c3, L
D(C)(5) = c1 + c2 + c3 + c4 + c5,
LD(C)(L) = c1+c2+c3+c4+c5+cL, L
D(C)(1, 2) = c1+c2, L
D(C)(1, 3) = c1+c3,
LD(C)(1, 5) = c1+ c2+ c3+ c4+ c5, L
D(C)(1, L) = c1+ c2+ c3+ c4+ c5+ cL,
LD(C)(1, 2, 3) = c1 + c2 + c3, L
D(C)(2, 5, L) = c1 + c2 + c3 + c4 + c5 + cL,
LD(C)(1, 2, 3, 4) = c1+c2+c3+c4, L
D(C)(1, 3, 4, 5, L) = c1+c2+c3+c4+c5+cL,
LD(C)(1, 2, 3, 4, 5) = c1+c2+c3+c4+c5, L
D(C)(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, L) = c1+c2+c3+c4+c5+cL.
In the cooperative game theory, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is the
most important solution concept. It is given below.
Definition 7 For any game C : 2N → R, the Shapley value is given by
xShi (C) =
∑
S∋i
(n− |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
n!
(C(S)− C(S \ {i}), i = 1, ..., n. (9)
The Shapley value of an agent can be regarded as an average of the
marginal cost incurred by the agent to each and every coalition of other
agents.
Another important solution concept is the core. In the context of cost
sharing, a core allocation is an allocation which cannot be dominated by an
alternative allocation in which some agent or coalition of agents can have
their cost shares reduced by themselves and be better off given their stand-
alone cost. In other words, once a core allocation is proposed, no coalition
of agents has the incentive to change the allocation. The core of a game is
the set of all core allocations. In general, a game may have an empty core.
The Shapley value of a game may or may not be in the core of the game
when the latter is nonempty. But, Shapley (1971) shows that a concave cost
game always has a nonempty core and moreover, the Shapley value is in the
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core. A (cost) game is concave if an agent’s marginal cost is non-increasing
as the agent joins larger coalitions. Formally, a game C(·) is concave if
C(S ∪ i)− C(S) ≥ C(T ∪ i)− C(T ), ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ N, i /∈ T.
In the next section, we will show that the three games defined above are
all concave. Thus, their Shapley values are in the core of the corresponding
games. Moreover, we will show that the three methods coincide with the
Shapley values of the three games, respectively. Therefore, the solutions by
the three methods are all core allocations of the corresponding games.
We conclude this section by pointing out that while the LRS and the UES
are the extensions of the two corresponding methods in Ni and Wang (2007),
the DES is closely related to the well-known airport landing fee solution
(Littlechild and Owen, 1973, 1977).18 This can be shown by considering the
following special case where the tree network is a line-tree.
1 c12 c23 c34 c4L, cL
The Upstream Equal Sharing is the following:
xUES1 (C) = c1 +
1
2
c2 +
1
3
c3 +
1
4
c4 +
1
5
cL,
xUES2 (C) =
1
2
c2 +
1
3
c3 +
1
4
c4 +
1
5
cL,
xUES3 (C) =
1
3
c3 +
1
4
c4 +
1
5
cL,
xUES4 (C) =
1
4
c4 +
1
5
cL,
xUESL (C) =
1
5
cL,
and it coincides with the UES in Ni and Wang (2007).
18Note that the DES is defined for a different problem than the airport landing fee
problem.
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The Downstream Equal Sharing, on the other hand, coincides with the
airport landing fee solution.
xDES1 (C) =
1
5
c1
xDES2 (C) =
1
5
c1 +
1
4
c2
xDES3 (C) =
1
5
c1 +
1
4
c2 +
1
3
c3
xDES4 (C) =
1
5
c1 +
1
4
c2 +
1
3
c3 +
1
2
c4
xDESL (C) =
1
5
c1 +
1
4
c2 +
1
3
c3 +
1
2
c4 + cL
3 Characterizations of the LRS, the UES and
the DES Methods
3.1 A Characterization of the LRS Method
In order to characterize the LRS method, similar to Ni and Wang (2007), we
need the following axioms.
Additivity: For anyC1 = (c11, . . . , c
1
n, c
1
L) ∈ R
n+1
+ and C
2 = (c21, . . . , c
2
n, c
2
L) ∈
Rn+1+ , we have xj(C
1 + C2) = xj(C
1) + xj(C
2) for all j ∈ N ∪ {L}.
Additivity is a classical axiom in the cooperative game theory (Shap-
ley, 1953) and the cost sharing literature (Moulin, 2002). As a mathemati-
cal structural invariance axiom, Additivity itself has no normative content.
However, for our pollution cost sharing problem, we can provide the follow-
ing interpretation.
Imagine that in the river network cost sharing problem, the agents have
to share two kinds of costs, namely the pollution costs and the maintenance
costs. Additivity says that there is no difference whether the agents share
the two costs separately or together.
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No Blind Costs: For any i ∈ N ∪ {L} and any C ∈ Rn+1+ , if ci = 0, then
xi(C) = 0.
No Blind Costs says that if an agent’s cost is zero, then the agent’s cost
share should be zero as well. This axiom rules out cross subsidization be-
tween the agents. If an agent’s cost is zero, it means that there is no pollution
(cost) at the agent’s location. Therefore, the agent neither pollutes herself
and her downstream nor is polluted by her upstream agents. Thus, the agent
shouldn’t bear any cost.
Efficiency:
∑n+1
j=1 xj =
∑n+1
j=1 cj.
Efficiency is always satisfied by a cost sharing method by definition. Nev-
ertheless, we mention it explicitly in all our characterizations as it is the only
axiom that is related to economic efficiency.19
Theorem 1 The Local Responsibility Sharing method is the unique method
that satisfies Additivity, No Blind Costs and Efficiency. It coincides with the
Shapley value of the stand-alone game of the problem. Moreover, it is in the
core of the game.
The proof of theorem is similar to the proofs of Theorem 1, Propositions
1 and 2 in Ni and Wang (2007). We omit it.
3.2 A Characterization of the UES Method
In this subsection, we provide a characterization of the Upstream Equal
Sharing method and show that it coincides with the Shapley value of the
Upstream-oriented game generated from the problem. Moreover, it is in the
core.
19By economic efficiency we mean Pareto efficiency. But note that in this paper Effi-
ciency is just a budget balance condition, i.e., the sum of the cost shares collected from the
agents is exactly equal to the total costs. It does not mean that it is a Pareto efficient cost
sharing in which the cost sharing method induces the agents reporting their true pollution
costs. A complete discussion of this cost sharing game would be too complicated and is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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Recall that for a given cost function C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn, cL), the associated
Upstream-oriented game is defined by
LU(C)(S) = C(σ(S)) =
∑
j∈σ(S)
cj, S ⊆ N ∪ {L},
where σ(S) = S ∪ Pˆ−1(S) = S ∪ (
⋃
j∈S Pˆ
−1(i)).
Note that
LU(C)(N ∪ {L}) = C(σ(N ∪ {L})) = C(N ∪ {L}).
The Upstream Equal Sharing method is repeated below.
xUESi (C) =
∑
j∈σ({i})
cj
|α({j})|
, i = 1, ..., n, L, (10)
where |α({j})| is the number of the elements in α({j}), and α({j}) =
{j} ∪ Pˆ ({j}) = {j} ∪ Pˆ (j).
We introduce the following axioms.
Independence of Upstream Costs: For any i ∈ N ∪ {L}, any C,C ′ ∈
Rn+1+ such that cl = c
′
l, l ∈ Pˆ
−1(i), we have xj(C) = xj(C
′) for all j ∈ Pˆ−1(i).
This axiom is based on the Downstream Responsibility principle, which
is a responsibility version of the theory of the Unlimited Territorial Integrity
as we discussed in the introduction. It says that an agent’s cost share only
depends on her own pollution cost as well as all her downstream costs, but
not on upstream costs for which she is assumed not responsible.
Upstream Symmetry: For any i ∈ N ∪ {L}, for all j, k ∈ α({i}) =
{i} ∪ Pˆ (i), we have
xj(0, ..., 0, ci, 0, ..., 0) = xk(0, ..., 0, ci, 0, ..., 0).
The Upstream Symmetry requires that all upstream agents have equal
responsibilities for a given downstream cost. We treat all upstream agents
equally in terms of responsibility for a given downstream cost because we
assume that, first, pollution cannot be washed away easily and, secondly, it
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is hard to tell exactly how much each upstream agent contributes to the given
downstream cost. Moreover, the axiom implies that any agent, no matter
how far she is from any of her downstream agents, her responsibility remains
the same.
The following Independence of Irrelevant Costs axiom is essential in all
our characterizations in this paper. As we discussed before, it imposes an
upper bound on an agent’s responsibility, i.e., an agent is not responsible for
any cost that is irrelevant to her. Formally,
Independence of Irrelevant Costs: For any i ∈ N ∪ {L}, for all j ∈
N ∪ {L} \ (Pˆ (i) ∪ {i} ∪ Pˆ−1(i)), we have
xj(0, ..., 0, ci, 0, ..., 0) = 0.
This is a compelling axiom since if two agents are not related to each other
in the river network in terms of the upstream-downstream relationship, each
agent wouldn’t affect the other in pollution cost sharing. Thus, it is plausible
to require that neither agent should be responsible for the cost of the other.
This axiom allows us to extend the responsibility theory derived from the
theory of the Unlimited Territorial Integrity to a tree network.
Note that in Ni and Wang (2007), each agent is either an upstream or
a downstream of all other agents in the linear river model. But in our tree
model, the upstream-downstream relation on the agents is a partial order.
Now we are ready to state the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The Upstream Equal Sharing method is the unique method that
satisfies Additivity, Independence of Upstream Costs, Upstream Symmetry,
Independence of Irrelevant Costs and Efficiency. Moreover, it coincides with
the Shapley value of the Upstream-oriented game of the problem, and it is in
the core of the game.
Proof: We divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1. First, we show that the Shapley value xSh of the Upstream-
oriented game LU(C) coincides with the UES method xUES.
By the definition of the Upstream-oriented game, for any
Ck = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0),
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where 1 is the kth component of the n+1-dimensional vector Ck, the corre-
sponding Upstream-oriented game is given by
LU(Ck)(S) = 0 if S ⊂ N ∪ {L}\α({k}) and LU(Ck)(S) = 1 otherwise.
Clearly, all agents in N ∪{L}\α({k}) are dummy agents and all agents in
α({k}) are symmetric. Thus the Shapley value of the game LU(Ck) is given
by
xShi (L
U(Ck)) =
{
1
|α({k})|
, i ∈ α({k})
0, otherwise
(11)
for all i ∈ N ∪ {L}.
Since the cost vectors, Ck(k ∈ {1, . . . , n, L}), form a basis of Rn+1, for
any C ∈ Rn+1+ , it can be uniquely written as C =
∑
k∈N∪{L} ck · C
k. By the
definition of the Upstream-oriented game, for ∅ = S ⊆ N ∪ {L}, we have
LU(C)(S) =
∑
j∈σ(S)
cj
=
∑
j∈σ(S)
(
∑
k∈N∪{L}
[ck · C
k]j)
=
∑
k∈N∪{L}
ck · (
∑
j∈σ(S)
[Ck]j)
=
∑
k∈N∪{L}
ck · L
U(Ck)(S)
where [C]j is the jth component of the vector C. Because the Shapley value
satisfies Additivity, we have
xShi (L
U(C)) =
∑
k∈N∪{L}
ck · x
Sh
i (L
U(Ck))
=
∑
k∈N∪{L}\σ({i})
0 +
∑
k∈σ({i})
ck
|α({k})|
= xUESi (C)
for all i ∈ N ∪ {L}.
Step 2. We show that the UES method is the unique method satisfying
Additivity, Independence of Upstream Costs, Upstream Symmetry, Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Costs and Efficiency.
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We first show that xUES satisfies these five axioms. Additivity is straight-
forward. To show that xUES satisfies Independence of Upstream costs, for
any i ∈ N ∪ {L}, any C,C ′ ∈ Rn+1+ such that cl = c
′
l, l ∈ Pˆ
−1(i), then for all
j ∈ Pˆ−1(i), we have
xUESj (C) =
∑
l∈σ({j})
cl
|α({l})|
=
∑
l∈{j}∪Pˆ−1(j)
cl
|α({l})|
=
∑
l∈{j}∪Pˆ−1(j)
c′l
|α({l})|
= xUESj (C
′)
since j ∈ Pˆ−1(i)⇒ Pˆ−1(j) ⊆ Pˆ−1(i).
To see that xUES satisfies Upstream Symmetry, for any i ∈ N ∪ {L}, for
all j, k ∈ α({i}) = {i} ∪ Pˆ (i), we have
xUESj (0, ..., 0, ci, 0, ..., 0) =
∑
l∈σ({j})
cl
|α({l})|
=
∑
l∈{j}∪Pˆ−1(j)
cl
|α({l})|
=
ci
|α(i)|
=
∑
l∈{k}∪Pˆ−1(k)
cl
|α({l})|
=
∑
l∈σ({k})
cl
|α({l})|
= xUESk (0, ..., 0, ci, 0, ..., 0).
We now show that xUES satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Costs. Since
j ∈ N∪{L}\(Pˆ (i)∪{i}∪Pˆ−1(i)), we have i /∈ Pˆ−1(j). Otherwise, i ∈ Pˆ−1(j)
implies j ∈ Pˆ (i), a contradiction. Thus, if C = (0, ..., 0, ci, 0, ..., 0), then
cl = 0 for all l ∈ {j} ∪ Pˆ
−1(j) = σ(j). We therefore have
xUESj (C) =
∑
l∈σ({j})
cl
|α({l})|
= 0.
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Finally, in Step 1 we have shown that xUES is the Shapley value of the
Upstream-oriented game. Since the Shapley value satisfies Efficiency, xUES
also satisfies Efficiency.
Now we show that the UES is the only method satisfying the five ax-
ioms. Suppose that a cost sharing method x satisfies the five axioms. Fix
a arbitrary tree consisting of n + 1 nodes. For any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n, L}, let
Ck = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) where 1 is the kth component of the n + 1-
dimensional vector Ck. By Independence of Upstream Costs, xj(C
k) = 0
for all j ∈ Pˆ−1(k). By Independence of Irrelevant Costs, xj(C
k) = 0 for all
j ∈ N ∪ {L}\(Pˆ (k)∪ σ({k})). By Upstream Symmetry, xj(C
k) = xj′(C
k) =
β ≥ 0 for all j, j ′ ∈ α({k}). By Efficiency, we have∑
j∈N∪{L}
xj(C
k)
=
∑
j∈Pˆ−1(k)
xj(C
k) +
∑
j∈{k}∪Pˆ (k)
xj(C
k) +
∑
j∈N∪{L}\(Pˆ (k)∪{k}∪Pˆ−1(k))
xj(C
k)
= 0 +
∑
j∈α({k})
β + 0
= β × |α({k})|
= 1
therefore xj(C
k) = 1
|α({k})|
if j ∈ α({k}) and xj(C
k) = 0 otherwise.
Again, for any C ∈ Rn+1+ , it can be uniquely written as C = (c1, . . . , cn, cL) =∑
k∈N∪{L} ck · C
k. By Additivity, we have
xi(C) = xi(
∑
k∈N∪{L}
ck · C
k)
=
∑
k∈N∪{L}
ck · xi(C
k)
=
∑
k∈N∪{L}\(Pˆ (i)∪σ({i}))
0 +
∑
k∈Pˆ (i)
0 +
∑
k∈σ({i})
ck
|α({k})|
= xUESi (C)
for all i ∈ N ∪ {L}.
Step 3. We now show that the Shapley value is in the core. It suffices
to show that the Upstream-oriented game LU(C) is concave. That is, for all
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i ∈ N ∪ {L}, all S, T ⊂ (N ∪ {L})\{i} and S ⊂ T , we have
LU(C)(S ∪ {i})− LU(C)(S) ≥ LU(C)(T ∪ {i})− LU(C)(T ). (12)
Suppose that S ⊂ T and i /∈ T . Let HUS = σ(S ∪ {i})\σ(S) and H
U
T =
σ(T ∪ {i})\σ(T ). We claim that HUT ⊆ H
U
S .
Since
HUS = σ(S ∪ {i})\σ(S)
= S ∪ {i} ∪ Pˆ−1(S) ∪ Pˆ−1(i) \ (S ∪ Pˆ−1(S))
= {i} ∪ Pˆ−1(i) \ (S ∪ Pˆ−1(S)),
and
HUT = {i} ∪ Pˆ
−1(i) \ (T ∪ Pˆ−1(T )),
and that
T ∪ Pˆ−1(T ) ⊇ S ∪ Pˆ−1(S),
we thus have
HUT ⊆ H
U
S .
Therefore,
LU(C)(S ∪ {i})− LU(C)(S) =
∑
j∈σ(S∪i)
cj −
∑
j∈σ(S)
cj
=
∑
j∈HU
S
cj
≥
∑
j∈HU
T
cj
=
∑
j∈σ(T∪i)
cj −
∑
j∈σ(T )
cj
= LU(C)(T ∪ {i})− LU(C)(T ).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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3.3 A Characterization of the DES Method
We now provide a characterization of the Downstream Equal Sharing method
and show that it coincides with the Shapley value of the Downstream-oriented
game of the problem and, moreover, is in the core of the game.
Recall that for a given cost function C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn, cL), the Downstream-
oriented game is defined by
LD(C)(S) = C(α(S)) =
∑
j∈α(S)
cj, S ⊆ N ∪ {L},
where α(S) = S ∪ Pˆ (S) = S ∪ (
⋃
j∈S Pˆ (i)).
Note that
LD(C)(N ∪ {L}) = C(α(N ∪ {L})) = C(N ∪ {L}).
The Downstream Equal Sharing method is repeated below.
xDESi (C) =
∑
j∈α({i})
cj
|σ({j})|
, i = 1, ..., n, L, (13)
where σ({j}) = {j} ∪ Pˆ−1({j}) = {j} ∪ Pˆ−1(j).
To characterize the DES, we need the following two axioms.
Independence of Downstream Costs: For any i ∈ N ∪{L}, any C,C ′ ∈
Rn+1+ such that cl = c
′
l, l ∈ Pˆ (i), we have xj(C) = xj(C
′) for all j ∈ Pˆ (i).
The Independence of Downstream Costs imposes an upper bound on an
agent’s cost share, i.e., it wouldn’t be dependent on her downstream agents’
costs. This axiom, as we discussed in the introduction on the Downstream
Responsibility principle, says that an agent’s responsibility in cost sharing is
directed toward her upstream rather than the downstream. This alternative
theory is in contrast to the Upstream Responsibility. Note that this version
of the responsibility theory is a derived responsibility from the dual problem,
namely the water sharing problem (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002).
Downstream Symmetry: For any i ∈ N ∪ {L}, for all j, k ∈ σ({i}) =
{i} ∪ Pˆ−1(i), we have
xj(0, ..., 0, ci, 0, ..., 0) = xk(0, ..., 0, ci, 0, ..., 0).
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Similar to the Upstream Symmetry, the Downstream Symmetry treats all
downstream agents equally in terms of responsibility for a given upstream
cost. Again this axiom ignores the physical distance between the agents. In
other words, all agents, no matter how far they are from any of their given
upstream agents, are equally responsible for their costs. This axiom together
with the previous axiom, specifies the downstream responsibility.
Now we state the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The Downstream Equal Sharing method is the unique method
that satisfies Additivity, Independence of Downstream Costs, Downstream
Symmetry, Independence of Irrelevant Costs and Efficiency. Moreover, it
coincides with the Shapley value of the Downstream-oriented game of the
problem and, is in the core of the game.
Proof: The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2. To do that, we
only need to replace the Independence of Upstream Costs and the Upstream
Symmetry in the proof of Theorem 2 by the Independence of Downstream
Costs and the Downstream Symmetry, respectively. It is also straightforward
to check that the Downstream Equal Sharing method coincides with the
Shapley value of the Downstream-oriented game of the problem and is in the
core of the game. We omit the details.
The UES and DES methods provide the upper and lower bounds for an
agent’s cost shares. Apparently, the upstream agents prefer the DES but
the downstream agents prefer the UES. Some compromise between the two
solutions should be made. For example, in realistic situations, a weight can
be assigned to each agent according to the agent’s observable characteristics
such as the agent’s pollutant emission/abatement level, willingness-to-pay
or ability-to-accept, the size of the agent (e.g., population), the distance
between the agent to the Lake, etc. Costs can be then allocated according
to a weighted average rather than the equal division of the costs among the
relevant agents.
3.4 An Example: the Baiyangdian Lake Catchment
In this part, we provide a real life example of the pollution cost sharing
problem in China. The two cost sharing methods, the UES and the DES,
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suggested by our model bring forward two extreme viewpoints between which
policy makers can balance their choices in allocating the total costs of the
project.
The Baiyangdian Lake, the largest remaining semi-closed freshwater body
in the northern China, is one of the most important and vulnerable ecosys-
tems. It lies in the middle reaches of Daqing River Basin and ultimately
discharges in Bohai Gulf and the Yellow Sea. All of the lake body is located
in Anxin and Xiong counties of Baoding Municipality. The lake has a surface
area of 366 km2 and consists of a series of natural low-lying depressions and
reed marshes. There are four large-scale reservoirs upstream of the lake, in-
cluding Angezhuang, Longmen, Wangkuai, and Xidayang with water flowing
into the lake via eight rivers.
Historically, the lake served many environmental and economic purposes
and was called as the “kidney” of the northern China. Its strategic position
is reflected by its major role in regulating floodwater discharges and water
levels, and subsequently moderates waterlogging. The lake has been an eco-
nomically important source of freshwater fish and reed production as well as
a source for drinking water and irrigation.
However, over the last four decades, the size of the lake has decreased
by almost half because of controlled water flows, and soil erosion, rising
population, expanded agricultural and industrial activities, limited solid and
wastewater disposal measures in the upstream and within the lake area.20
The lake has been a major depository of wastewater discharges, pollutant
substances, and sediments. Almost all the subproject urban areas discharge
untreated wastewater into the adjacent rivers and eventually to the lake.
Major industries within the service areas include tanneries, textile, paper,
automobile, fertilizer, chemicals, and machinery plants which are all polluting
industries. It is estimated that half of the pollution originates from the
upstream, while the other half emanates from the population of more than
200,000 living in the lake’s wetlands and surrounding areas.
20Indiscriminate logging in the upper watersheds, mining and quarrying, and conversion
of forests and wetlands to agricultural/industrial sites, have contributed to massive soil
erosion and land degradation which in turn, have caused excessive water obstruction along
the tributaries that feed into the lake.
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Figure 2. Wastewater treatment plants in Baiyangdian area
Eutrophication of the lake has become a serious problem. Water quality
deteriorated from class III to classes IV and V over the past four decades.21
In 2008, an integrated Project cofinanced by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and Global Environment Facility (GEF), with a total investment of
US$203.7 million, helps to construct 13 wastewater treatment plants in the
upstream of Lake Baiyangdian, along with other facilities such as water sup-
ply, reforestation, rehabilitation of watershed, flood control etc. The Project
reduces the COD by 36,850 tons/year (or 365,000 m3/day of wastewater)
21Class V is considered equivalent to raw sewage according to China’s National Ambient
Water Quality Standards for Surface Water.
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upon completion. It also reduces morbidity rates by 10% and improves sani-
tation and hygiene for 1.12 million people and maintains a sustainable healthy
water level of the lake. The locations of the wastewater treatment plants are
shown in Figure 2.
The 13 wastewater treatment plants located in the main counties and
townships in the upstream are essential for pollution reduction in Lake Baiyang-
dian. Other subprojects around the lake such as reforestation and wastershed
rehibilitation also contribute to the restoration of the lake’s environmental
and economic functions. The investment figures for the subprojects are round
up and depicted in Figure 3 with an illustration of the tree-structure water
flows. The unit is million US$.22
 
Lake Baiyangdian 
$56 
Player 2: Xinxing  
$8 
Player 3: Liushi 
$7 
Player 1: Li 
$9 
Player 12: Dingxing 
$11 
Player 5: Dingzhou 
$5 
Player 6: Mancheng 
$6 Player 7: Xushui 
$7 
Player 9: Xiong 
$9 
Player 10: Wenquancheng 
$7 
Player 8: Anxin 
$3 
Player 13: Baigou 
$8 
Player 11: Yi 
$8 
Player 4: Tang 
$4 
Figure 3. Illustration of the Baiyangdian Lake Project
According to the formulae developed in this paper, we calculate the two
cost sharing solutions based on the UES and DES methods, respectively.
22Because the operation and maintenance costs can be covered by the wastewater tariff
collected from households and industrial users, we confine our cost sharing analysis only
on the construction costs.
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First, we calculate the UES sharing:
xUES1 (C) = c1 +
1
3
c3 +
1
14
cL =
46
3
, xUES2 (C) = c2 +
1
3
c3 +
1
14
cL =
43
3
,
xUES3 (C) =
1
3
c3 +
1
14
cL =
19
3
, xUES4 (C) = c4 +
c5
2
+ c8
10
+ cL
14
= 168
10
,
xUES5 (C) =
1
2
c5 +
1
10
c8 +
1
14
cL =
108
10
, xUES6 (C) = c6 +
1
10
c8 +
1
14
cL =
133
10
,
xUES7 (C) = c7 +
1
10
c8 +
1
14
cL =
133
10
, xUES8 (C) =
1
10
c8 +
1
14
cL =
43
10
,
xUES9 (C) = c9 +
c10
5
+ c8
10
+ cL
14
= 112
10
, xUES10 (C) =
1
5
c10 +
1
10
c8 +
1
14
cL =
62
10
,
xUES11 (C) = c11 +
1
3
c13 +
1
5
c10 +
1
10
c8 +
1
14
cL =
203
15
,
xUES12 (C) = c12 +
1
3
c13 +
1
5
c10 +
1
10
c8 +
1
14
cL =
298
15
,
xUES13 (C) =
1
3
c13 +
1
5
c10 +
1
10
c8 +
1
14
cL =
133
15
,
xUESL (C) =
1
14
cL = 4.
Then, we calculate the DES sharing:
xDES1 (C) =
1
3
c1 = 3, x
DES
2 (C) =
1
3
c2 =
8
3
,
xDES3 (C) =
1
3
c1 +
1
3
c2 +
1
2
c3 =
55
6
, xDES4 (C) =
1
4
c4 =
3
2
,
xDES5 (C) =
1
3
c5 +
1
4
c4 =
35
6
, xDES6 (C) =
1
3
c6 = 3,
xDES7 (C) =
1
3
c7 = 3,
xDES8 (C) =
c8
2
+ c5+c6+c7+c10
3
+ c4+c9+c13
4
+ c11+c12
5
= 1363
60
,
xDES9 (C) =
1
4
c9 =
5
4
,
xDES10 (C) =
1
5
c10 +
1
5
(c11 + c12) +
1
4
(c9 + c13) =
563
60
,
xDES11 (C) =
1
5
c11 =
8
5
, xDES12 (C) =
1
5
c12 =
11
5
,
xDES13 (C) =
1
5
(c11 + c12) +
1
4
c13 =
29
5
,
xDESL (C) =
c3+c8
2
+ c1+c2+c5+c6+c7+c10
3
+ c4+c9+c13
4
+ c11+c12
5
+ cL = 87
53
60
.
As for the project implementation, Baoding municipal government repaid
the investment costs to ADB and GEF. Historically the Baoding municipal-
ity hoped that the counties and townships could finance their wastewater
treatment plants but it turned out that they did not have an incentive to do
so. The reason is twofold, first, the pollutants that an upstream township
discharges can be hardly observable or verifiable; second, the counties and
townships did not have an idea what is the fair share or “price” they should
contribute. It is hoped that in situations where there is no centralized au-
thority such as international water resource negotiations, our methods can
provide a framework or guideline.
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4 Concluding Remarks
We studied the cost sharing problem in a polluted river network. We pro-
posed three cost sharing methods for the problem and provided their ax-
iomatic characterizations. Our characterizations are based on the two well-
known theories in international disputes. We also showed that these three
methods are the Shapley values of the three associated games of the problem.
Moreover, they are in the cores of the three games, respectively.
Our paper can be extended in a number of directions. For example,
between the two opposing versions of responsibility (the UR and the DR),
a range of them can be proposed. Accordingly, a set of methods can be
generated by considering all the weighted averages of the UES and the DES
methods. We can make the weights depending on the weights we assign to
each and every agent. In assigning weights to the agents, we can take into
account the differences between the agents in, e.g., population, pollutant
emission, the location of the agent in the network, etc.
A more challenging but perhaps more useful extension of our work could
be to combine the water sharing problem with the water pollution cost shar-
ing problem. In fact, Weber (2001) has considered the problem of allocating
water and pollution rights along a river. But, in Weber (2001), there is a
single source of water. There are no branches or inflows at various locations
of the agents. Also the pollution rights are exogenously assigned by a regu-
lator. Agents engage in trading water rights and pollution rights by playing
a noncooperative game. Our approach in this paper is axiomatic and can be
considered as the reverse of the Weber’s. We begin with ceratin normative
principles (axioms). The cost sharing methods determined by the various
combinations of the axioms would, in effect, determine or imply implicitly
an assignment of property rights.
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